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- Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch, Jean-Philippe Lefort
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for… (More)

- Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2012

We show that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We point out that the class of symmetric… (More)

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence… (More)

- Stefan Bauernschuster, Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Radovan Vadovic
- 2009

The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention in an experimental labor market that is rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions to occur. We find that higher sick pay is reciprocated by workers through higher effort but… (More)

- Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2014

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule… (More)

- Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule “imitate-the-best” can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting… (More)

- Jörg Oechssler, Alex Roomets, +5 authors Jean-Philippe Lefort
- 2014

We describe an ambiguity hedging problem in Ellsberg experiments, where combinations of individually ambiguous bets eliminate aggregate ambiguity, andwhichmay yield incorrect classifications of ambiguity averse subjects. We propose a new classification consistent with this hedging possibility. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

- Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
- ArXiv
- 2010

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further… (More)

- Maros Servátka, S. Tucker, +22 authors Filip Veselý
- 2008

While most of the previous literature interprets trust as an action, we adopt a view that trust is represented by a belief that the other party will return a fair share. The agent’s action is then a commitment device that signals this belief. In this paper we propose and test a conjecture that economic agents use trust strategically. That is, the agents… (More)