Pete Mandik

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  • Andy Clark, Jesse Prinz, Adrian Cussins, Brian Smith, Pete Mandik
  • 2001
1 This paper grew out of an invited commentary on papers by Adrian Cussins and Brian Cantwell-Smith, presented in a session on nonconceptual content at the Eastern APA, Washington , January 1998. Thanks to Adrian Cussins for encouraging me in this project and for granting permission to refer to his unpublished ms. Thanks also to various anonymous referees,(More)
According to representationalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that(More)
Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to(More)
Conscious experiences are supposed by many to be subjective in the sense of being perspectival or from a point-of-view (see, for example Nagel 1974, 1986 and Tye 1995). Allegedly, the subjectivity of consciousness is beyond the grasp of science, which is objective (Nagel 1986). If you wanted a scientific understanding of consciousness, how would you solve(More)
Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one's actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing(More)
s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine's brief flirtation with a " mitigated phenomenalism " (Gibson's phrase) in the late 1940's and early 1950's, Quine's ontology of 1953 (" On Mental Entities ") and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might(More)
This article takes up the issue of the plausibility of epistemological theories of consciousness: accounts of the so-called " hard problem " of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996) that are rooted in physicalistic explanations of what we know and how we know it. Such accounts elaborate how physical systems come to (perceptually) know their physical(More)