Learn More
1 This paper grew out of an invited commentary on papers by Adrian Cussins and Brian Cantwell-Smith, presented in a session on nonconceptual content at the Eastern APA, Washington , January 1998. Thanks to Adrian Cussins for encouraging me in this project and for granting permission to refer to his unpublished ms. Thanks also to various anonymous referees,(More)
According to representationalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that(More)
Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to(More)
The exponentially increasing body of work on the human brain has not only taught us a lot about how the brain does cognition, it has also had a profound influence on other disciplines that study cognition and behaviour. A notable example, interestingly enough, is philosophy. A small movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical(More)
In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing –- the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the(More)
This article takes up the issue of the plausibility of epistemological theories of consciousness: accounts of the so-called " hard problem " of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996) that are rooted in physicalistic explanations of what we know and how we know it. Such accounts elaborate how physical systems come to (perceptually) know their physical(More)
Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one's actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing(More)