Pete Mandik

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1 This paper grew out of an invited commentary on papers by Adrian Cussins and Brian Cantwell-Smith, presented in a session on nonconceptual content at the Eastern APA, Washington , January 1998. Thanks to Adrian Cussins for encouraging me in this project and for granting permission to refer to his unpublished ms. Thanks also to various anonymous referees,(More)
According to representationalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that(More)
Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to(More)
This article takes up the issue of the plausibility of epistemological theories of consciousness: accounts of the so-called " hard problem " of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996) that are rooted in physicalistic explanations of what we know and how we know it. Such accounts elaborate how physical systems come to (perceptually) know their physical(More)
5 Though the following problem is not explicitly raised by her, it seems sufficiently 6 similar to an issue of pertinence to Akins's " Black and White and Color " (Akins 7 2013) to merit the moniker, Akins's Problem 1 : 8 Can there be a visual experience devoid of both color phenomenology and black-and-white 9 phenomenology? 10 The point of the present(More)
s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine's brief flirtation with a " mitigated phenomenalism " (Gibson's phrase) in the late 1940's and early 1950's, Quine's ontology of 1953 (" On Mental Entities ") and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might(More)