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While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how " the shadow of the future " affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing(More)
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by(More)
We use a novel experimental design to identify the strategies used by subjects in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design strategies that will play in their place. We find that the strategy elicitation has negligible effects on behavior supporting the validity of this method. We study the strategies chosen by the(More)
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and(More)
This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determined by test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitive ability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitive ability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data,(More)
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of in…nitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how " the shadow of the future " a¤ects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate in…nitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing(More)
There have been major advances in the theoretical study of the determinants of cooperation with many applications in economics and the social sciences. A growing experimental literature has studied the determinants of cooperation, tested different predictions of the theory, and suggested an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equi-libria in(More)
>IJH=?J We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the(More)
We analyze how economy-wide forces (i.e.shocks to terms of trade, technology and endowments) affect the intensity of social conflict. We see conflict phenomena such as crime and civil war as involving resource appropriation activities. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer will reduce conflict. Positive shocks to labor intensive(More)