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How do income shocks a¤ect armed con ‡ict? Theory suggests two opposite e¤ects. If labor is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower con ‡ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost e¤ect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is(More)
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by(More)
We use a novel experimental design to identify the strategies used by subjects in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design strategies that will play in their place. We find that the strategy elicitation has negligible effects on behavior supporting the validity of this method. We study the strategies chosen by the(More)
  • Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Oscar Volij, Jose Apesteguia, Pedro Dal Bó, Vicki Bogan, Juan Carrillo +4 others
  • 2006
We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum two-person strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2x2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. Consistent with their behavior in the field, they play with a high degree of(More)
  • Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume R Fréchette, Masaki Aizer, V Aoyagi, Matthew Bhaskar, Embrey
  • 2014
There have been major advances in the theoretical study of the determinants of cooperation with many applications in economics and the social sciences. A growing experimental literature has studied the determinants of cooperation, tested different predictions of the theory, and suggested an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equi-libria in(More)
Household bargaining theory predicts that as a woman's income increases relative to a man's, violence against her should decrease. We estimate the impact of women's relative wage on domestic violence. To account for the endogeneity of wage we take advantage of a tradition of sex-segregation by industry to construct a measure of relative wage that is based(More)
>IJH=?J We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the(More)
  • Ernesto Dal, Bó U C Berkeley, Pedro Dal Bó, Rafael Di, Tella, Herschel Grossman +3 others
  • 2004
We analyze how economy-wide forces (i.e.shocks to terms of trade, technology and endowments) affect the intensity of social conflict. We see conflict phenomena such as crime and civil war as involving resource appropriation activities. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer will reduce conflict. Positive shocks to labor intensive(More)
We present a model where groups attempt to exert influence on policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution.(More)
We analyze a simple stochastic environment where policymakers can be threatened by " nasty " interest groups. In the absence of these groups, the policymaker's desire for reelection guarantees that good policies are implemented for every realization of the shock. When pressure groups can harass the policymaker, good policies will be chosen for only a subset(More)