Pavlo Prokopovych

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  • BY ANDREW MCLENNAN, PAULO K. MONTEIRO, +5 authors R. TOURKY
  • 2011
We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Reny’s argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Nishimura and Friedman (1981) that is not covered by his theorem. We use(More)
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called β-δ) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set to characterize the equilibrium payoff set U(β, δ). While(More)
We provide a unified approach to existence of Nash equilibria in (possibly) discontinuous and qualitative games. We combine the idea of a local continuous selection of each player’s strict upper contour set from the qualitative games literature with the “better reply security” idea (Reny [15]) of activating different players locally from the discontinuous(More)
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