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- BY ANDREW MCLENNAN, PAULO K. MONTEIRO, +5 authors R. TOURKY
- 2011

We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Reny’s argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Nishimura and Friedman (1981) that is not covered by his theorem. We use… (More)

- Hector Chade, Pavlo Prokopovych, Lones Smith
- J. Economic Theory
- 2008

We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called β-δ) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set to characterize the equilibrium payoff set U(β, δ). While… (More)

The focus of this paper is on developing verifiable sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed… (More)

We provide a unified approach to existence of Nash equilibria in (possibly) discontinuous and qualitative games. We combine the idea of a local continuous selection of each player’s strict upper contour set from the qualitative games literature with the “better reply security” idea (Reny [15]) of activating different players locally from the discontinuous… (More)

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