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- BY ANDREW MCLENNAN, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, +5 authors Rabee Tourky
- 2011

We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Renyâ€™s argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Nishimura and Friedman (1981) that is not covered by his theorem. We useâ€¦ (More)

- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Frank H. Page
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in playersâ€™ strategies. We show that if any such compact game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure compact game G has a mixedâ€¦ (More)

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want only one object. (This is a reasonable assumption in the sale of condominiums or in the sale of government-owned residential units to low-income families). In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work asâ€¦ (More)

In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies for both firstand secondpriceâ€¦ (More)

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First , we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), andâ€¦ (More)

We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show via examples and our existence result that, in general, when facing consumers with budget constraints the monopolist isâ€¦ (More)

- Ricardo Lagos, Guillaume Rocheteau, +4 authors Paulo Klinger Monteiro
- 2004

This paper studies the effects of anticipated inflation on aggregate output and welfare within a search-theoretic framework. We allow money-holders to choose the intensities with which they search for trading partners, so inflation affects the frequency of trade as well as the quantity of output produced in each trade. We consider the standard pricingâ€¦ (More)

- Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, +10 authors Stephen Morris
- 2015

We consider the problem of a seller who faces a privately informed buyer and only knows one (in the more general case, arbitrary) moment of the distribution from which valuations are drawn. In face of this uncertainty, the seller maximizes his worst-case expected profits. Insurance against uncertainty takes a simple form. Conditional on sales, the sellerâ€™sâ€¦ (More)

- Ensaios EconÃ´micos, Flavio M. Menezes, +6 authors Paulo Klinger Monteiro
- 1999

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individualâ€™s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected pricesâ€¦ (More)

- Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Akram Temimi
- 1998

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. We provide necessary conditions thatâ€¦ (More)