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- Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou
- Commun. ACM
- 2005

We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial time solvability of normal form games and graphical games, establishing that… (More)

- Paul W. Goldberg, Mark Jerrum
- Machine Learning
- 1993

The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (V-C) dimension is an important combinatorial tool in the analysis of learning problems in the PAC framework. For polynomial learnability, we seek upper bounds on the V-C dimension that are polynomial in the syntactic complexity of concepts. Such upper bounds are automatic for discrete concept classes, but hitherto little has been… (More)

We address the fundamental question of whether the Nash equilibria of a game can be computed in polynomial time. We describe certain efficient reductions between this problem for normal form games with a fixed number of players and graphical games with fixed degree. Our main result is that the problem of solving a game for any constant number of players, is… (More)

- Paul W. Goldberg, Martin Charles Golumbic, Haim Kaplan, Ron Shamir
- Journal of Computational Biology
- 1995

Physical mapping is a central problem in molecular biology and the human genome project. The problem is to reconstruct the relative position of fragments of DNA along the genome from information on their pairwise overlaps. We show that four simplified models of the problem lead to NP-complete decision problems: Colored unit interval graph completion, the… (More)

Gaussian processes provide natural non-parametric prior distributions over regression functions. In this paper we consider regression problems where there is noise on the output, and the variance of the noise depends on the inputs. If we assume that the noise is a smooth function of the inputs, then it is natural to model the noise variance using a second… (More)

- Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking
- SIAM J. Comput.
- 2008

Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided markets. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings, introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is well known that stable matchings can be computed in polynomial time, but many real-life markets lack a central authority to match agents. In those markets, matchings are formed by actions… (More)

- Curtis W. Marean, Miryam Bar-Matthews, +11 authors Hope M Williams
- Nature
- 2007

Genetic and anatomical evidence suggests that Homo sapiens arose in Africa between 200 and 100 thousand years (kyr) ago, and recent evidence indicates symbolic behaviour may have appeared approximately 135-75 kyr ago. From 195-130 kyr ago, the world was in a fluctuating but predominantly glacial stage (marine isotope stage MIS6); much of Africa was cooler… (More)

- Mary Cryan, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg
- SIAM J. Comput.
- 1998

The j-State General Markov Model of evolution (due to Steel) is a stochastic model concerned with the evolution of strings over an alphabet of size j. In particular, the Two-State General Markov Model of evolution generalises the well-known Cavender-Farris-Neyman model of evolution by removing the symmetry restriction (which requires that the probability… (More)

- Paul W. Goldberg
- PODC
- 2004

This paper studies a load balancing game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, that is intended to model a set of users who share several internet-based resources. Some of the recent work on this topic has considered the problem of constructing <i>Nash equilibria</i>, which are choices of actions where each user has optimal utility given the actions… (More)

Weighted threshold games are coalitional games in which each player has a weight (intuitively corresponding to its voting power), and a coalition is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given threshold. Key questions in coalitional games include finding coalitions that are stable (in the sense that no member of the coalition has any rational… (More)