Paul Horwich

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Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e.g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model–suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]–that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the(More)
Prima facie, meaning seems to be a normative property in the simple following sense: if something exemplifies a given meaning property, then some normative consequences follow. So, for example, if the French word ‘cheval’ meansHorse – if it is correctly used to refer to horses –, then it is a mistake to use it to refer to thingswhich are not horses.(More)
In this paper I argue against previous approaches to the semantics of generics which involved the notions of prototype, stereotype and relevant quantification. I assume that the logical form of generics includes a generic operator which, as Heim (1992) has suggested, can be construed as the modal operator of necessity. After demonstrating that the presence(More)
This paper is about the semantic structure of verbal and deverbal noun phrases. The focus is on noun phrases which describe actions, perceptions, sensations and beliefs. It is commonly thought that actions are movements of parts of the agent’s body which we typically describe in terms of their effects, and that perceptions are slices of sensible experience(More)
I discuss what I take to be the strongest recent arguments for and against mind/body identity. On the pro side I discuss Lewis' views, and on the con Kripkels. The discuss10n of Kr1pke takes the form of an examination of the major objections which have been made against his ·views. ~ne conclusion of my discussion of Lewis 1s that he has not adequately(More)
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