Paul E Atkinson

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members of the Working Party on Tax Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs as well as other OECD colleagues for drafting suggestions and/or comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The authors would also like to thank Lyn Urmston for technical support. All errors and omissions, of course, are the authors.
This article treats some ideas and issues that are part of ongoing reflection at the OECD. They were first raised in a major research article for the Reserve Bank of Australia conference in July 2008, and benefited from policy discussion in and around that conference. One fundamental cause of the crisis was a change in the business model of banking, mixing(More)
Acknowledgements We gave versions of this paper at the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interactionism Couch-Stone Symposium held at the University of Nottingham in July 1996. We received helpful feedback from our two discussants, that there was such a phenomenon, and that it might be showcased at that meeting. We are grateful to her for the idea; but she(More)
Since the crisis, even with massive support from governments and central banks, widespread regulatory changes and promises from bank executives to improve the governance of risk, the world continues to see failures of Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs, like Dexia), and huge losses (most recently from JP Morgan). Banks refuse to(More)
and the United Kingdom have been completed so far while others are under preparation. More generally, the paper is related to work by different OECD Directorates including other colleagues at the OECD for valuable comments and help accessing data. The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not engage the OECD or its member(More)
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people's money while gains were privatised and losses socialised. It is shown that banks need little capital in calm periods, but in a crisis they need too much – there is no reasonable ex-ante capital rule for large systemically important(More)
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people's money: excess leverage and default pressure resulting from contagion and counterparty risk. This paper looks at whether the Basel III agreement addresses these issues effectively. Basel III has some very useful elements, notably a(More)