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Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as eBay. In these and in many other applications the auctions in use are single-/multi-item auctions with unit demand. The main drawback of standard mechanisms for this type of auctions, such as VCG and GSP, is the <i>limited expressiveness</i> that they offer to… (More)

A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In practice, however, many mechanisms use a restricted message space. This motivates the study of the tradeoffs… (More)

The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We… (More)

We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions u i,j (p j) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price p j. For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. We give sufficient… (More)

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to feasible, envy free, and bidder optimal outcomes. For settings without budgets such an outcome always exists and can be… (More)

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to the design of payment rules. This computational approach… (More)

Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop ``black-box reductions'' from double-auction design to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing single-sided mechanisms.
We consider several desirable properties… (More)

Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-parameter mechanism design problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy algorithm. Milgrom and Segal [2014] recently introduced these auctions and proved that they satisfy a remarkable list of incentive guarantees: in addition to being dominant-strategy… (More)

Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent, non-negative numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the prophet sees the entire sequence at once. The goal of both is to decide on fractions of each number they want to keep so as to maximize the weighted fractional sum of the numbers chosen. The classic result of… (More)

We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for… (More)