Paul Dütting

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Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as eBay. In these and in many other applications the auctions in use are single-/multi-item auctions with unit demand. The main drawback of standard mechanisms for this type of auctions, such as VCG and GSP, is the <i>limited expressiveness</i> that they offer to(More)
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In practice, however, many mechanisms use a restricted message space. This motivates the study of the tradeoffs(More)
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions u i,j (p j) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price p j. For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. We give sufficient(More)
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We(More)
Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as " slots " , for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond(More)
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to the design of payment rules. This computational approach(More)
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for(More)
It is desirable for an economic mechanism that its properties hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to the participants. In this paper we focus on the design of position auctions and seek mechanisms that guarantee high revenue in every efficient equilibrium under both complete and(More)