Paul Benacerraf

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ion as a legitimate form of implicit definition has been authenticated. And it is this, so it may be suggested, that requires the development of satisfactory answers to (M) and (E) and related questions. If it looks as if the truth of abstraction principles may turn on substantial metaphysical hostages, or as if there are special problems about knowing that(More)
In “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. “[S]omething must be said to bridge the chasm, created by [...] [a] realistic [...] interpretation of mathematical propositions... and the human knower,” he writes. For prima facie “the connection between the truth conditions for the statements of [our(More)
  • Howard K. Wettstein, Thomas Kelly, +6 authors Jill North
  • 2011
In this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps be conceded that the arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterly compelling; but the Mooreans among us will hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary(More)
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