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Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd
The basic idea of crowdfunding is to raise external finance from a large audience (the “crowd”), where each individual provides a very small amount, instead of soliciting a small group of
Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies
Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible
Individual crowdfunding practices
This study investigates characteristics of individual crowdfunding practices and drivers of fundraising success, where entrepreneurs can tailor their crowdfunding initiatives better than on
The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms
A description of the crowdfunding sector is provided, considering investment-based crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary payments and elaborates on cross-group and within-group external e¤ects and asymmetric information on crowdfunding platforms.
Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks
We analyze reciprocal market sharing agreements by which firms commit not to enter each other's territory in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market sharing agreements
Piracy and Competition
The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are
Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology
An economic theory of regional clusters
This paper investigates the impact of localization economies on firms' locations. It is known that such external effects lead to substantial cost reductions when firms are located together. However,
Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets
Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We
Yardstick competition and political agency problems
It is found that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians.