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  • Patrick Bajari, C Lanier Benkard, Jonathan Levin, Jeremy Fox, Phil Haile, Igal Hendel +7 others
  • 2006
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for(More)
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we consider several possible determinants that may influence the choice of auctions versus negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the(More)
  • Patrick Bajari, C Lanier Benkard, Daniel Ackerberg, Steven Berry, Richard Blundell, Timothy Bresnahan +13 others
  • 2001
We study the identification and estimation of preferences in hedonic discrete choice models of demand for differentiated products. In the hedonic discrete choice model, products are represented as a finite dimensional bundle of characteristics, and consumers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Our hedonic model also incorporates product(More)
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. We thank Ulrich Doraszelski and participants at various seminars for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved. Short(More)
Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of(More)
In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game allowing for discrete or continuous state variables. We first provide a general nonparametric identification result under the imposition of an exclusion restrictions on agents payoffs. Next we analyze large sample statistical properties of nonparametric and semiparametric(More)
Citation Fox, Jeremy T. et al. " A Simple Estimator for the Distribution of Random Coefficients. The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. We propose a simple mixtures estimator for recovering the joint distribution of parameter heterogeneity in economic models, such as the random(More)
We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based(More)
This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for " marrying(More)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids that can be submitted(More)