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- Pascal Paillier
- EUROCRYPT
- 1999

This paper investigates a novel computational problem, namely the Composite Residuosity Class Problem, and its applications to public-key cryptography. We propose a new trapdoor mechanism and derive from this technique three encryption schemes: a trapdoor permutation and two homomorphic probabilistic encryption schemes computa-tionally comparable to RSA.… (More)

- Michel Abdalla, Mihir Bellare, +7 authors Haixia Shi
- CRYPTO
- 2005

We identify and fill some gaps with regard to consistency (the extent to which false positives are produced) for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). We define computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency, show that the scheme of [7] is computationally consistent, and provide a new scheme that is… (More)

- Pascal Paillier, Damien Vergnaud
- ASIACRYPT
- 2005

We provide evidence that the unforgeability of several discrete log based signatures like Schnorr signatures cannot be equivalent to the discrete log problem in the standard model. This contradicts in nature well-known proofs standing in weakened proof methodologies, in particular proofs employing various formulations of the Forking Lemma in the random… (More)

- Cécile Delerablée, Pascal Paillier, David Pointcheval
- Pairing
- 2007

This paper puts forward new efficient constructions for public-key broadcast encryption that simultaneously enjoy the following properties: receivers are stateless; encryption is collusion-secure for arbitrarily large collusions of users and security is tight in the standard model; new users can join dynamically i.e. without modification of user decryption… (More)

- Marc Joye, Pascal Paillier, Serge Vaudenay
- CHES
- 2000

The generation of prime numbers underlies the use of most public-key schemes, essentially as a major primitive needed for the creation of key pairs or as a computation stage appearing during various cryptographic setups. Surprisingly, despite decades of intense mathematical studies on primality testing and an observed progressive intensi-fication of… (More)

- Thomas Fuhr, Pascal Paillier
- ProvSec
- 2007

As such, public-key encryption with keyword search (a.k.a PEKS or searchable encryption) does not allow the recipient to decrypt keywords i.e. encryption is not invertible. This paper introduces search-able encryption schemes which enable decryption. An additional feature is that the decryption key and the trapdoor derivation key are totally independent ,… (More)

- Jean-Sébastien Coron, Marc Joye, David Naccache, Pascal Paillier
- CRYPTO
- 2002

A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result with the private exponent, as for example in PSS. Usually, the RSA… (More)

- Pascal Paillier
- ASIACRYPT
- 2000

This paper introduces three new probabilistic encryption schemes using elliptic curves over rings. The cryptosystems are based on three specific trapdoor mechanisms allowing the recipient to recover discrete logarithms on different types of curves. The first scheme is an embodiment of Naccache and Stern's cryptosystem and realizes a discrete log encryption… (More)

This paper proposes an efficient and provably secure transform to encrypt a message with any asymmetric one-way cryptosystem. The resulting scheme achieves adaptive chosen-ciphertext security in the random oracle model. Compared to previous known generic constructions (Bellare, Rogaway, Fujisaki, Okamoto, and Pointcheval), our embedding reduces the… (More)

- Jean-Sébastien Coron, Marc Joye, David Naccache, Pascal Paillier
- EUROCRYPT
- 2000

This paper introduces two new attacks on pkcs#1 v1.5, an rsa-based encryption standard proposed by RSA Laboratories. As opposed to Bleichenbacher's attack, our attacks are chosen-plaintext only, i.e. they do not make use of a decryption oracle. The first attack applies to small public exponents and shows that a plaintext ending by sufficiently many zeroes… (More)