Parikshit Ghosh

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Dowry is a ubiquitous feature of South Asian marriage markets. However, empirical research on dowry has been limited by the lack of data. We utilize retrospective information on gifts exchanged at the time of marriage for 39,544 marriages during 1960-2008 to describe dowry trends in contemporary rural India. Average real net dowry has been remarkably stable(More)
The new Bill on land acquisition recently tabled in Parliament is well intentioned but seriously flawed. Its principal defect is that it attaches an arbitrary mark-up to the historical market price to determine compensation amounts. This will guarantee neither social justice nor the efficient use of resources. The Bill also places unnecessary and severe(More)
This paper proposes a bridge between the Herding literature and the literature on Rational Expectations under asymmetric information. In particular we examine how the presence of discrete investment decisions affects the properties of a market equilibrium where information is costly to acquire. We choose to focus on the case where individual decisions are(More)
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes in the firm, and, in most cases, with the strength of the(More)
We develop a model of competition among socially motivated microfinance institutions (MFIs), where the MFIs offer repayment-based incentive contracts to credit agents. The agents gather information regarding a borrower, and may, or may not collude with the borrower, taking bribes in return for not acting upon their information in case of collusion. We show(More)
In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instil norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low. We first build a simple game theoretic model to capture the(More)