Paolo G. Piacquadio

  • Citations Per Year
Learn More
I study the egalitarian way of distributing resources across generations. Distributional equity deeply conflicts with the Pareto principle: efficient allocations cannot guarantee that i) each generation be assigned a consumption bundle that is at least as large as an arbitrarily small fraction of the bundle assigned to any other generation and that ii) each(More)
The paper addresses intergenerational and intragenerational equity in an overlapping generation economy. We aim at defining an egalitarian distribution of a constant stream of resources, when preferences are ordinal and non-comparable. We establish the impossibility of efficiently distributing resources while treating equally agents with same preferences(More)
We provide an axiomatic justification to aggregate money metrics. The key axiom requires the approval of richer-to-poorer transfers that preserve the overall efficiency of the distribution. This transfer principle, together with the basic axioms anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and a version of welfarism, characterizes a standard social welfare function(More)
This paper attempts to give a rationale to public announcements, so often observed in the real world, and to formalize the idea that they can be used as a form of equilibrium selection device when multiple equilibria arise. It also shows how announcements solve the problems of coordination failures as predicted by the empirical literature based on(More)
Theory and evidence point towards particularly positive effects of high-quality child care for disadvantaged children. At the same time, disadvantaged families often sort out of existing programs. To counter differences in learning outcomes between children from different socioeconomic backgrounds, governments are pushing for universal child care. However,(More)
This paper studies the emergence of social norms when individuals have heterogeneous private preferences and pressure each other while declaring a stance in public. It characterizes conditions under which a social norm can (and cannot) arise. Further, it shows that peer pressure may lead to a norm which is biased with respect to private preferences in(More)
Individuals save for their old days, but not all of them enjoy the old age. This paper characterizes the optimal capital accumulation in a twoperiod OLG model where lifetime is risky and varies across individuals. We compare two long-run social optima: (1) the average utilitarian optimum, where steady-state average welfare is maximized; (2) the egalitarian(More)