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We consider a standard sequential decision to adopt/buy a good in a herding environment. The setup is same as in Sgroi (2002). Contrary to the basic herding case we introduce a cost that the agents have to pay for the information about their predecessors' actions. All agents receive informative signals as in the standard herding models but do not view the(More)
We characterize optimal strategies in a simple herding model where observations have a small cost. We assume that there are two states and two possible signals that each agent may get. The prior distribution is biased towards adopting behavior. That is, ex-ante, adopting gives a higher expected utility than not adopting. Contrary to Kultti & Miettinen(More)
We consider a voting situation where a society has to decide on the rule to use when choosing among two alternatives in the uncertain future. Our analysis is related to the set up of Barbera and Jackson (2001). While they consider …nite societies in our set up the economy has an in…nite amount of agents. We de…ne a binary dominance relation over the set of(More)
We characterize optimal strategies in a simple herding model where observations have a small cost. We assume that there are two states and two possible signals that each agent may get. The prior distribution is biased towards adopting behavior. That is ex-ante adopting gives a higher expected utility than not adopting. Contrary to Kultti & Miettinen (2005)(More)
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. * I thank Klaus Kultti for numerous useful discussions and advice and Juuso Välimäki for his advice and for encouraging me to tackle this problem. I am extremely grateful for the associate editor and two referees for their valuable(More)
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