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Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases
We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics and finance are related to cognitive…
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Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an…
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Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility,…
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On the joint use of liability and safety regulation
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Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and…
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On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information
  • P. Schmitz
  • Economics
    J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 September 2002
TLDR
A research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology will sometimes sell two licences, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive licence.
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The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
TLDR
The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed, and emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.
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On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
  • P. Schmitz
  • Economics
    J. Econ. Theory
  • 17 December 2002
TLDR
It is shown that the first best cannot be achieved whenever the ex post efficient trade decision is trivial and the second-best contract is characterized and an application of the model to the choice of risky projects is briefly discussed.
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Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment
Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that exclusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can…
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
TLDR
It is found that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment, and can be explained by Hart and Moore's (2008) notion that contracts may serve as reference points.
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