We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracles—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice.Expand

We provide the first formal treatment of entity authentication and authenticated key distribution appropriate to the distributed environment for the symmetric, two-party setting.Expand

Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, all possible passwords.Expand

We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack.Expand

We describe highly efficient constructions, XE and XEX, that turn a blockcipher \(E: \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1 \}^{n} \rightarrow \{\mathbb{I}\) into a tweakable blockc Cipher.Expand

We exhibit an encryption scheme for which (i) any string x of length slightly less than k bits can be encrypted as f(rx), where r x is a simple probabilistic encoding of x depending on the hash function, and (ii) the scheme is not only semantically secure but also non-malleable and secure against chosen-ciphertext attack.Expand

We describe an RSA-based signing scheme which combines essentially optimal efficiency with attractive security properties; we provide a second scheme which maintains all of the above features and in addition provides message recovery.Expand

Finite PRFs, and the concrete security analysis of constructions based on them, is a technique for investigating the e cacy of many classical (not-so-classical) cryptographic constructions.Expand