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Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation

This paper presents evidence that "social capital" matters for measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market…
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New tools in comparative political economy : the database of political institutions

This article introduces a large new cross-country database, the database of political institutions. It covers 177 countries over 21 years, 1975-95. The article presents the intuition, construction,…
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INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract…
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New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions

This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). The authors summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this…
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Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national…
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Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility

The paper studies the empirical relationship between banking crises and financial liberalization in a panel of 53 countries for the period 1980-95. We find that banking crises are more likely to…

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

Governments unable to make credible promises hinder economic development and effective policymaking. Scholars have focused considerable attention on checks and balances and the delegation of…
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Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called “contract-intensive money” or CIM, is based on…
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Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth

We argue that social polarization reduces the security ofproperty and contract rights and, through this channel,reduces growth. The first hypothesis is supported by cross-country evidence indicating…
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Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies

This article identifies for the first time systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies and argues that these are driven by the inability of political competitors to make…
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