Learn More
According to David Rosenthal, a mental state is conscious just in case its subject suitably represents herself as being in that state, where this entails that the mental state " is accompanied by a noninferential, nondispositional, assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state " (2002a, p. 410; see also Rosenthal, 1997, p. 742). This(More)
Jaegwon Kim argues that nonreductive physicalism entails the causal irrelevance of mental features both to mental and physical effects. 1 My focus will be on Kim's reasons for denying the causal relevance of mental properties to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies. Also, my focus will be on intentional states (e.g. beliefs and(More)
Paul Raymont carleton university I want to thank Arthur Sullivan for his response (this issue) to my article, " Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? " (Raymont 2001). In that article, I argued that much of the recent debate about epiphenomenalism invokes a confused notion of causal relevance. While Sullivan also finds fault with this debate, he does so(More)
Current views of consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist accepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitivism as we understand it is the view that consciousness is just a form of representation or an information-processing property of a system that has representations or perhaps both. Anti-cognitivists deny this, appealing to thought(More)
I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a(More)
In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing(More)
  • 1