Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that(More)
This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear(More)
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discon-tinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new " finitistic " infinite-game generalization of Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on(More)
We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategy equilibria. We illustrate that in continuous supermodular games, perfect equi-libria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermod-ular games satisfying sequential(More)