A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, qua-siconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result… (More)
A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting… (More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that… (More)
We prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium within a class of compact , metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.
In moving from finite-action to infinite-action games, standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept cease to satisfy certain " natural " properties. For instance, perfect equilibria in compact, continuous games need not be admissible. This paper highlights additional properties of two standard refinement specifications that are not inherited by… (More)
We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategy equilibria. We illustrate that in continuous supermodular games, perfect equi-libria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermod-ular games satisfying sequential… (More)