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A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, qua-siconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result… (More)

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that… (More)

Keywords: Infinite game Normal-form game Strategic stability Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium a b s t r a c t We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form games whose members possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is… (More)

A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting… (More)

In moving from finite-action to infinite-action games, standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept cease to satisfy certain " natural " properties. For instance, perfect equilibria in compact, continuous games need not be admissible. This paper highlights additional properties of two standard refinement specifications that are not inherited by… (More)

This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear… (More)

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P Mclean
- 2013

We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discon-tinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new " finitistic " infinite-game generalization of Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on… (More)

Suppose that (X, A) is a measurable space and Y is a metrizable, Souslin space. Let A u denote the universal completion of A. For x ∈ X, let f (x, ·) be the lower semicontinuous hull of f (x, ·). If f : X × Y → R is (A u ⊗ B(Y), B(R))-measurable, then f is (A u ⊗ B(Y), B(R))-measurable. Let (X, A) be a measurable space. For every bounded measure µ on (X,… (More)

We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategy equilibria. We illustrate that in continuous supermodular games, perfect equi-libria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermod-ular games satisfying sequential… (More)