#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (20)

#### Publication Year

2003

2015

- This year (0)
- Last 5 years (9)
- Last 10 years (18)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

#### Key Phrases

Learn More

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Efe A. Ok
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting… (More)

- Massimo Morelli, Huanxing Yang, +4 authors Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
- 2008

In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two States. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation;… (More)

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2011

Article history: Received 26 May 2009 Available online 29 July 2010 JEL classification: C72

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
- Games
- 2011

We prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.

- Esteban F. Klory, Eyal Winterz, +6 authors Brad Coker
- 2006

This paper studies the e¤ects that the revelation of information on the electorates preferences has on votersturnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a signi
cant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and only for these electorates) the provision of information… (More)

We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form gameswhosemembers possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is stable if and only if it contains a single Nash equilibrium. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

A strategic-form game is a potential game if the incentive of all players to change their strategy can be expressed in one global function, called the game’s potential. Potential games have many applications in Economics and other disciplines (cf. Rosenthal 1973, Monderer and Shapley 1996, Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2005, Armstrong and Vickers 2001, Myatt and… (More)

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x . Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and… (More)

We compare the properties of several notions of perfectness within classes of compact, metric, and (possibly) discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of perfectness may fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible… (More)