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A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, qua-siconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result… (More)

A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting… (More)

Keywords: Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Limit admissibility Discontinuous game Infinite normal-form game Payoff security a b s t r a c t We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions… (More)

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that… (More)

We explore the consequences of electoral competition for nonlinear income taxation. Our model is a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to non-linear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional.… (More)

We prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium within a class of compact , metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.

Keywords: Infinite game Normal-form game Strategic stability Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium a b s t r a c t We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form games whose members possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is… (More)

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P Mclean
- 2013

We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discon-tinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new " finitistic " infinite-game generalization of Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on… (More)

This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear… (More)

In moving from finite-action to infinite-action games, standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept cease to satisfy certain " natural " properties. For instance, perfect equilibria in compact, continuous games need not be admissible. This paper highlights additional properties of two standard refinement specifications that are not inherited by… (More)