Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

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Keywords: Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Limit admissibility Discontinuous game Infinite normal-form game Payoff security a b s t r a c t We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that(More)
We explore the consequences of electoral competition for nonlinear income taxation. Our model is a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to non-linear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional.(More)
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discon-tinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new " finitistic " infinite-game generalization of Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on(More)
This paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income. We present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules. This set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear(More)