A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting… (More)
In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two States. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation;… (More)
for very helpful discussions. We thank Hernan Meller for his valuable research assistance and Brad Coker from Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. for providing us with the data on gubernatorial elections. The paper has bene…ted from the comments of audiences at seminars and conferences too many to mention. All errors and mistakes in the paper remain our… (More)
We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.
We prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium within a class of compact , metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.
Keywords: Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Limit admissibility Discontinuous game Infinite normal-form game Payoff security a b s t r a c t We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions… (More)
Keywords: Infinite game Normal-form game Strategic stability Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium a b s t r a c t We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form games whose members possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is… (More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Keywords: Pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium Infinite normal-form game Selten perturbation Discontinuous game Quasiconcave game Payoff security We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that… (More)
A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, qua-siconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result… (More)
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discon-tinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new " finitistic " infinite-game generalization of Selten's (Int J Game Theory 4: 25–55, 1975) notion of perfection and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on… (More)