Ophir Friedler

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—In post-silicon functional validation, one of the most complex and time-consuming processes is the localization of an instruction that exposes a bug detected at system level. The task is particularly difficult due to the silicon's limited observability and the long time between a failure's occurrence and its detection. We propose a novel method that(More)
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation v for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some S, T , v(S ∪ T) < v(S) + v(T)) and complements (i.e., for some S, T , v(S ∪ T) > v(S) + v(T)). We show that the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together guarantees a Θ(d)(More)
In a network design game [1] each agent seeks to connect two nodes in a directed network at a minimal cost. The strategies employed by each agent include all the paths that connect that agent's two nodes (termed origin and destination). The paths may represent roads, internet cables, or even water pipelines. The cost of an edge is a function of the number(More)
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to n bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in(More)
We devise a unified framework for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in clustering games on networks. This class of games has two properties exhibited by many real-life social and economic settings: (a) an agent's utility is affected only by the behavior of her direct neighbors rather than that of the entire society, and (b) an agent's utility does(More)
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. Devanur et al. [2015] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of <i>O</i>(log <i>m</i>) for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on the PoA of single bid auctions was known for(More)
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