Ophir Friedler

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In a network design game [1] each agent seeks to connect two nodes in a directed network at a minimal cost. The strategies employed by each agent include all the paths that connect that agent's two nodes (termed origin and destination). The paths may represent roads, internet cables, or even water pipelines. The cost of an edge is a function of the number(More)
We devise a unified framework for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in clustering games on networks. This class of games has two properties exhibited by many real-life social and economic settings: (a) an agent's utility is affected only by the behavior of her direct neighbors rather than that of the entire society, and (b) an agent's utility does(More)
—In post-silicon functional validation, one of the most complex and time-consuming processes is the localization of an instruction that exposes a bug detected at system level. The task is particularly difficult due to the silicon's limited observability and the long time between a failure's occurrence and its detection. We propose a novel method that(More)
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. Devanur et al. [2015] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of <i>O</i>(log <i>m</i>) for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on the PoA of single bid auctions was known for(More)
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. To this end, we introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions that we refer to as Maximum over Positive-Supermodular (MPS). The MPS hierarchy is parameterized by a single integer d that captures the level of complementarity. Any valuation in MPS-d is in MPH-(d + 1) [18], and(More)
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