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The preemption problem
According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it hadExpand
The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy
According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics, and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would haveExpand
Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder
In this article I argue against Schroeder's account of the weight of normative reasons. It is shown that in certain cases an agent may have reasons she cannot know about without them ceasing to beExpand
Disagreement, Indirect Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence
Some philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical skeptical conclusions that others take it to generate. Since disagreement is usually classified as being a type of hExpand
Harming and failing to benefit: a reply to purves
A prominent objection to the counterfactual comparative account of harm is that it classifies as harmful some events that are, intuitively, mere failures to benefit. In an attempt to solve thisExpand
The Problem of Justified Harm: a Reply to Gardner
In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of itExpand
Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
ABSTRACT Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur,Expand
Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focus on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe them to ...
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