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Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties
Theory: A classic question in political science concerns what determines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question,Expand
The Presidential Calculus
This article proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two policy-making strategies: aExpand
Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies
Europe has over the past century experienced an impressive increase in the number of presidential heads of state. Many of the new democracies since the mid-1970s are semi-presidential regimes thatExpand
Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective
Cabinets link the executive and legislative branches, thus linking parties and government, in all democracies. Variation in cabinet appointments can help explain differences in policy-making andExpand
Presidents and cabinets: The political determinants of fiscal behavior in Latin America
What political factors drive fiscal behavior in Latin America’s persidential democracies? This work seeks to identify the political determinants of the level of public spending and the primaryExpand
Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and coalition discipline in Brazil
All presidential cabinets formed in Brazil between 1985 and 1998 included politicians from more than one party and could, in principle, be defined as coalition cabinets. The article evaluates to whatExpand
The Executive Connection
Comparative theories of legislatures have generally focused on the impact of electoral system-generated incentives on party discipline. While hypotheses advanced by this literature can explainExpand
The Puzzle of Party Discipline in Brazil
Ames, Barry. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. Notes, tables, maps, figures, appendix, bibliography, index, 331 pp.; hardcover $59.50. Figueiredo,Expand
The Inefficient Secret Revisited: The Legislative Input and Output of Brazilian Deputies
Shugart and Carey (1992) posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highlyExpand