O. Tejada

Learn More
We present parallel characterizations of two dierent values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a nite sequence of partitions dened on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of dierent levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value rst(More)
We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of coalition structures that may arise for any given set of players. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of these latter probability distributions, defined as the(More)
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of finance. Abstract In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models(More)
  • 1