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- Nikolai S. Kukushkin
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2004

If in a finite strategic game all strategies are scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners’ choices, and one of three “single crossing” conditions is satisfied, then every best… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2011

Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an “ordered… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin
- Order
- 2013

We study when the existence of an increasing selection can be derived from the monotonicity of a multifunction w.r.t. an extension of the basic order from points to subsets. The most interesting… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2002

Games with perfect information giving rise to potential normal forms are described. For agent normal forms, a potential is defined such that a strategy profile is a maximizer for the potential if and… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Cristian Marius Litan, Francisco Marhuenda
- J. Economic Theory
- 2008

We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria… (More)

Strategic games are considered where: every player chooses from a compact subset of the real line; the partners’ choices affect each player’s utility only through their scalar aggregate, which is… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi, Tetsuo Yamamori
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2005

In a finite game with strategic complementarities, every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path. If, additionally, the strategies are scalar,… (More)

- Nikolai S. Kukushkin
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2011

If the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash… (More)

We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium as well as the… (More)

We consider strategic games where strategy sets are linearly ordered while the preferences of the players are described by binary relations. All restrictions imposed on the preferences are satisfied… (More)