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The Secretary Recommendation Problem
TLDR
We study the sender's optimization problem subject to persuasiveness constraints of the receiver for several variants of the secretary problem. Expand
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Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion
TLDR
We study an information-structure design problem (i.e., a Bayesian persuasion problem) in an online scenario. Expand
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Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
TLDR
We study a setting with multiple senders but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim stage, with which sender to interact. Expand
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Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
TLDR
We show that in several natural and prominent cases the optimization problem is tractable even when the message space is limited. Expand
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J ul 2 01 9 The Secretary Recommendation Problem
In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach, in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one thatExpand