Nicolas Sauger

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The paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner candidate. In our experiment, the(More)
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave(More)
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude(More)
We propose a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate, and V, the candidate’s perceived viability. We test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections,(More)
The paper presents a series of experiments in which participants were invited to vote in four one round elections and four two round elections, with the same set of five candidates, among which three were viable and two were not. The experiments were designed to test the arguments put forward by Duverger and Cox about the propensity to vote sincerely or(More)
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