Nicolas Sahuguet

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1 I thank George Mailath and Steven Matthews for helpful conversations. I am aslo grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous referee for useful comments. All errors are mine. Abstract We model the search for volunteers as a war of attrition. Every player is tempted to wait for someone else to volunteer for the tasks. When tasks are not equivalent, it(More)
This paper shows that elections are good for peace and that politicians' fear of losing office is the reason why disputes between democracies are extremely rare. To examine the impact of electoral accountability on military conflicts, we construct a new dataset of executive term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816-2001 period, and combine(More)
This paper proposes a …rst step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model that extends models of redistributive politics by Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises …nanced through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable(More)
This paper extends the classic war of attrition to allow for a wide range of actions. Players alternate making arbitrary payments, and their opponent may either match this payment, or concede. We analyze both cases of complete and incomplete information. As opposed to the classic war of attrition, the equilibrium is unique, rent-dissipation is only partial,(More)
1 A previous version of this paper has been circulated under the title " Bluffing Beyond Poker ". The comments and the suggestions of Mark Armstrong and of two anonymous referees are much appreciated. We also would like to thank Abstract This paper analyzes a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal(More)
In wars of attrition, players choose how long they bid, but not how much. In all-pay auctions, players choose how much to bid, but not for how long. We study an all-pay auction where two players can spread their bids over two periods. The …rst period bid is used to in ‡uence payo¤s and beliefs of the opponent. The analysis reveals who is blu¢ng, creating an(More)
This paper introduces a model for blu¢ng that is relevant when bets are sunk and only actions-not valuations-determine the winner. Predictions from poker are invalid in such nonzero-sum games. Blu¢ng (respectively Sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A(More)
1 We thank Pablo Spiller and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We also thank Abstract We propose a model in which two parties select the internal organization that helps them win the election. Party choices provide incentives to the politicians who represent them. Depending on whether politicians are opportunistic or partisan, we(More)
Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement agents, etc.). Not much is known either normatively about the best way to incentivize the auditors, nor positively about what these incentives look like in real world organizations. This paper focuses on the positive question. It proposes a(More)
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