Nicolas Sahuguet

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We model the search for volunteers as a war of attrition. Every player is tempted to wait for someone else to volunteer for the tasks. When tasks are not equivalent, it may be optimal to volunteer quickly to perform an easy task. We analyze the trade-off between volunteering for an easy task and taking the risk of having to perform a more strenuous task in(More)
This paper shows that elections are good for peace and that politicians’ fear of losing office is the reason why disputes between democracies are extremely rare. To examine the impact of electoral accountability on military conflicts, we construct a new dataset of executive term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816-2001 period, and combine(More)
This paper analyzes a dynamic auction in which a fraction of each bid is sunk. Jump bidding is used by bidders to signal their private information. Bluffing (respectively Sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A player with a moderate valuation bluffs by(More)
We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by intermediaries in auction markets. We argue that while commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers the question of incidence deserves a new treatment in auction markets. We show that an increase in commissions makes sellers worse o¤, but buyers may strictly(More)
This paper introduces a model for blu¢ng that is relevant when bets are sunk and only actions -not valuationsdetermine the winner. Predictions from poker are invalid in such nonzero-sum games. Blu¢ng (respectively Sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong) player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak). A(More)
In wars of attrition, players choose how long they bid, but not how much. In all-pay auctions, players choose how much to bid, but not for how long. We study an all-pay auction where two players can spread their bids over two periods. The ...rst period bid is used to in‡uence payo¤s and beliefs of the opponent. The analysis reveals who is blu¢ng, creating(More)
We propose a model in which two parties select the internal organization that helps them win the election. Party choices provide incentives to the politicians who represent them. Depending on whether politicians are opportunistic or partisan, we identify four effects. First, a selection effect: intraparty competition gives parties more candidates to choose(More)
Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement agents, etc.). Not much is known either normatively about the best way to incentivize the auditors, nor positively about what these incentives look like in real world organizations. This paper focuses on the positive question. It proposes a(More)
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