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We investigate the problem of truthfully eliciting an expert's assessment of a property of a probability distribution, where a property is any real-valued function of the distribution such as mean or variance. We show that not all properties are elicitable; for example, the mean is elicitable and the variance is not. For those that are elicitable, we… (More)

- Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham
- EC
- 2009

Motivated by the prevalence of online questionnaires in electronic commerce, and of multiple-choice questions in such questionnaires, we consider the problem of eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions from a knowledgeable respondent. Specifically, each question is a statement regarding an uncertain future event, and is multiple-choice -- the… (More)

This paper studies protocols for eliciting and evaluating statistical forecasts. Nature draws a state at random from a finite state space, according to some distribution p. Prior to Nature’s move, a forecaster, who knows p, provides a prediction for a given statistic of p (i.e., answers a question about p). The protocol defines the forecaster’s payoff as a… (More)

- Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, +4 authors David M. Pennock
- EC
- 2008

We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable properties for wagering mechanisms, identifying one mechanism - weighted-score wagering - that satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we show that a single-parameter… (More)

- Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham
- WINE
- 2008

We consider the problem of truthfully sampling opinions of a population for statistical analysis purposes, such as estimating the population distribution of opinions. To obtain accurate results, the surveyor must incentivize individuals to report unbiased opinions. We present a rewarding scheme to elicit opinions that are representative of the population.… (More)

Suppose a principal Alice wishes to reduce her uncertainty regarding some future payoff. Consider a self-proclaimed expert Bob that may either be an informed expert knowing an exact (or approximate) distribution of a future random outcome that may affect Alice’s utility, or an uninformed expert who knows nothing more than Alice does. Alice would like to… (More)

- Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham
- ICEC
- 2007

We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumptions. The first explicitly models the repeated nature of keyword auctions. It introduces a novel assumption on individual bidding, namely that bidders never overbid their value, and… (More)

- Yossi Feinberg, Nicolas S. Lambert
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2015

Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (2011) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, category I, set of distributions. We present a prequential test based on calibration that… (More)

We analyze the computational complexity of market maker pricing algorithms for combinatorial prediction markets. We focus on Hanson's popular logarithmic market scoring rule market maker (LMSR). Our goal is to implicitly maintain correct LMSR prices across an exponentially large outcome space. We examine both permutation combinatorics, where outcomes are… (More)

- Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert
- EC
- 2009

Prosper, the largest online social lending marketplace with nearly a million members and $178 million in funded loans, uses an auction amongst lenders to finance each loan. In each auction, the borrower specifies <i>D</i>, the amount he wants to borrow, and a maximum acceptable interest rate <i>R</i>. Lenders specify the amounts <i>a<sub>i</sub></i> they… (More)