Nicolas Klein

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Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based pay are substitutes. A firm endogenously determines the mix of(More)
We consider a situation where an agent’s effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent’s well–being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent’s utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first–best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor’s preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what(More)
I study a dynamic relationship in which a principal delegates experimentation to an agent. Experimentation is modeled as a onearmed bandit that yields successes following a Poisson process. Its unknown intensity is high or low. The agent has private information, his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high. The agent values successes more than(More)
We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly negatively correlated between players. In marked contrast to the(More)
Background and Aims Recent parsimony-based reconstructions suggest that seeds of early angiosperms had either morphophysiological or physiological dormancy, with the former considered as more probable. The aim of this study was to determine the class of seed dormancy present in Amborella trichopoda , the sole living representative of the most basal(More)
This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms’ yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the types of the two(More)
Child protection is a sector undergoing major changes in which local authorities play a central role. There are several different types of child protection measures covering different needs: monitoring in the home, foster family, placement in a children's home or a stay in a mother-and-baby centre for young mothers. For all these children and adolescents,(More)
This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms’ yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the types of the two(More)