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- Florian Englmaier, Stephen Leider, Greg Baron, Tobias Böhm, Nicolas Klein, Georg Gebhardt
- 2008

Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based pay are substitutes. A firm endogenously determines the mix of… (More)

- Nicolas Klein, Sven Rady
- 2008

We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly negatively correlated between players. In marked contrast to the… (More)

- Yingni Guo, Daniel Barron, Alessandro Bonatti, Florian Ederer, Eduardo Faingold, Mitsuru Igami +3 others
- 2014

I study a dynamic relationship in which a principal delegates experimentation to an agent. Experimentation is modeled as a one-armed bandit that yields successes following a Poisson process. Its unknown intensity is high or low. The agent has private information , his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high. The agent values successes more… (More)

This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the tractability of Markov equilibrium, while… (More)

- Bandit Model, Nicolas Klein
- 2009

This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms' yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the types of the two… (More)

- Ufuk Akcigit, Qingmin Liu, Christopher Harris, Hugo Hopenhayn, Johannes Hörner, Matthew Jackson +4 others
- 2011

Technological progress is typically a result of trial-and-error research by competing firms. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms… (More)

- Nicolas Klein
- 2011

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to give an agent proper incentives to explore a hypothesis which can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty… (More)

- Nicolas Klein
- 2010

This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players face replica bandits, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms' yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. It is common knowledge that the types of the two… (More)

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