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- José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 2004

According to Wardrop’s first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash… (More)

We present a short geometric proof for the price of anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks. This novel proof also… (More)

- Fernando Ordóñez, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- Transportation Science
- 2010

N games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although… (More)

We study network and congestion games with atomic players that can split their flow. This type of games readily applies to competition among freight companies, telecommunication network service… (More)

- Olaf Jahn, Rolf H. Möhring, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- Operations Research
- 2005

The design of route guidance systems faces a well-known dilemma. The approach that theoretically yields the systemoptimal traffic pattern may discriminate against some users in favor of others.… (More)

- José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

We present a short, geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic… (More)

We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions are linear and there is a single… (More)

- José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- Operations Research
- 2007

We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions are linear and there is a single… (More)

- Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- SODA
- 2003

While Wardrop (1952) had introduced the concept of Nash equilibrium to describe user behavior in traffic networks, traffic engineers have proposed to utilize user equilibria in route-guidance systems… (More)

- Fernando Ordóñez, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
- NET-COOP
- 2007

Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which players select routes to maximize their utility. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication and distribution networks.… (More)