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A common assumption in network optimization models is that a central authority controls the whole system. However, in some applications there are independent users, and assuming that they will follow directions given by an authority is not realistic. Individuals will only accept directives if they are in their own interest or if there are incentives that(More)
This paper develops a game theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework to investigate net neutrality from a pricing perspective. In particular, we consider investment incentives of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) under both a neutral and non-neutral network regimes. In our model, two interconnected ISPs compete over quality and prices for(More)
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are agreements between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's territories by companies based in either country. Germany and Pakistan signed the first BIT in 1959 and since then, BITs are one of the most popular and widespread form of international(More)
We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if(More)
In this paper, we argue that the signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) can be explained by its differential impact on welfare and the distributive consequences of regulating and enforcing investment standards at the international level. We develop a model that formalizes the logic prevalent in the extant literature on the political economy of(More)
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