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We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of(More)
We investigate the computational complexity of finding optimal bribery schemes in voting domains where the candidate set is the Cartesian product of a set of variables and voters use CP-nets, an expressive and compact way to represent preferences. To do this, we generalize the traditional bribery problem to take into account several issues over which agents(More)
We introduce PREFLIB: A Library for Preferences; an online resource located at http://www.preflib.org. With the emergence of computational social choice and an increased awareness of the applicability of preference reasoning techniques to areas ranging from recommendation systems to kidney exchanges , the interest in preferences has never been higher. We(More)
In this paper we present a twofold generalization of conditional preference networks (CP-nets) that incorporates uncertainty. CP-nets are a formal tool to model qualitative conditional statements (cp-statements) about preferences over a set of objects. They are inherently static structures, both in their ability to capture dependencies between objects and(More)
We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment , in which an actor (called " The Lobby ") seeks to influence the voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria and three bribery methods to formally(More)
We investigate the computational complexity of finding optimal bribery schemes in voting domains where the candidate set is the Cartesian product of a set of variables and agents' preferences are represented as CP-nets. We show that, in most cases, the bribery problem is easy. This also holds for some cases of k-approval, where bribery is difficult in(More)
We discuss what behavioral social choice can contribute to computational social choice. An important trademark of behavioral social choice is to switch perspective away from a traditional sampling approach in the social choice literature and to ask inference questions: Based on limited, imperfect, and highly incomplete observed data, what inference can we(More)
Positional scoring rules in voting compute the score of an alternative by summing the scores for the alternative induced by every vote. This summation principle ensures that all votes contribute equally to the score of an alternative. We relax this assumption and, instead, aggregate scores by taking into account the rank of a score in the ordered list of(More)