Neslihan Uler

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Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study(More)
This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategicallyequivalent mechanisms that also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which(More)
We compare the determinants of individual giving between two countries, Spain and the US, which differ in their redistribution policies and their beliefs over the causes of poverty. By varying the information about the determinants of income, we find that, although overall giving is similar in both countries when subjects know the actual role of luck and(More)
This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution(More)
It is entirely appropriate that the study of public finance take seriously ‘‘behavioral’’ inconsistencies with traditional models of individual and collective decision-making. This raises the question of whether the state should play a role in protecting individuals from themselves, and whether individuals are susceptible to manipulation, or even(More)
When every individual’s effort imposes negative externalities, selfinterested behavior leads to socially excessive effort. To curb these excesses when effort cannot be monitored, competing output-sharing partnerships can form. With the right-sized groups, aggregate effort falls to the socially optimal level. We investigate this theory experimentally and(More)
This paper focuses on the relationship between voluntary giving and the degree of inequality aversion. Our model suggests that voluntary giving is increasing in the degree of inequality aversion for individuals of higher than average income; however, the sign of the effect is reversed for individuals that are poorer than the average. We test our theoretical(More)
The impact of redistributive policies on voluntary contributions is still not well understood. While a higher level of redistributive taxation decreases the price of voluntary giving, it also changes the income distribution by decreasing income inequality. This paper provides a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the net impact of the tax rate(More)
This paper explores how a change in a default—specifically, an exogenously given reference point—affects individual preferences. While reference dependence is extensively studied, very little is known regarding the impact of reference points on individual choice behavior when the reference points themselves are not chosen (Reference Effect). We identify(More)