Nenggang Xie

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The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has often been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most profitable may be the mixed phase sustaining both the cooperative as well as the defective strategy. Here we reexamine this assumption by investigating the evolution of cooperation in(More)
We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define them as the probabilities of(More)
Parrondo's games were first constructed using a simple tossing scenario, which demonstrates the following paradoxical situation: in sequences of games, a winning expectation may be obtained by playing the games in a random order, although each game (game A or game B) in the sequence may result in losing when played individually. The available Parrondo's(More)
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