Nejat Anbarci

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In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in ``guns'') that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We(More)
We use a human–subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that(More)
We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the(More)
Most real-life bargaining resolves gradually; two parties reach intermediate agreements without knowing the whole range of possibilities. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. Cooperative bargaining solutions ignore this dynamics and therefore can yield accurate predictions only if they are robust to its(More)
We use a human–subjects experiment to examine market outcomes in two related settings involving firm pricing and directed consumer search. In both, two firms simultaneously post asking prices for a single indivisible good; two buyers observe the prices and simultaneously choose which firm to visit. In a one–price model, each firm posts a single asking(More)
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under–exploit their bargaining position, compared to theoretical predictions. We conduct an experiment using two institutions: Nash demand game (NDG) and unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Unlike most previous experiments, disagreement payoffs are earned rather than assigned, and about(More)
Abstract: A number of recent studies have, separately, addressed the effects of public sector corruption and natural disasters. In this paper, we intersect these lines of research to assess whether corruption in the public sector plays a role in the havoc wrought by large scale natural disasters, using major earthquakes as the example. We first develop a(More)
In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)'s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is(More)