Neil van Leeuwen

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Research suggests that intuitions about thought experiments are vulnerable to a wide array of seemingly irrelevant factors. I argue that when arguments hinge on the use of intuitions about thought experiments, research on the subtle factors that affect intuitions must be taken seriously. To demonstrate how failing to consider such psychological influences(More)
  • Toni S. Adleberg, TONI ADLEBERG, +4 authors Dan Weiskopf
  • 2015
Many well-known arguments in the philosophy of mind use thought experiments to elicit intuitions about consciousness. Often, these thought experiments include mechanistic explanations of a systems' behavior. I argue that when we understand a system as a mechanism, we are not likely to understand it as an agent. AGENCY Model, understanding a system as an(More)
Experimental studies on willpower confirm the Strength Model of Self-Control, which claims that willpower depends on limited physiological resources. Exercising willpower depletes these resources, which impairs further exercises of willpower. This phenomenon is called " ego-depletion. " As a result, depleting these resources impairs further exercises of(More)
This thesis explores the implications of non-human primates' propensity to hyperbolically discount the future. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when small, near-term rewards are preferred over larger rewards that are realized at a future point in time, but these preferences do not hold when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made at a time(More)
In this thesis, I apply teleofunctionalism to a current debate concerning the normativity of practical rationality. Assuming teleofunctionalism is the correct theory of mental phenomena, I argue that it can provide a promising account of the normativity of practical rationality. This claim is motivated by the idea that a capacity to represent internal(More)
The unity of higher cognition: the case against dual process theory. ABSTRACT Dual process theorists posit the existence of two distinct types (type-1/type-2) of cognitive processing in order to explain domains of higher cognition such as reasoning and decision-making. Such theories typically allude to co-varying clusters of properties (i.e. a dual-cluster(More)
Current explanations for anchoring phenomena seem to be unable to account for the diversity of effects found by 40 years of research. Additionally, the theories do not have much to say about the processes that make anchors so resilient to modification. I argue that by focusing on the mechanisms involved in spatial representation, we can account for most(More)
Galen Strawson argues that we have a sense of mental selves, which are entities that have mental features but do not have bodily features. In particular, he argues that there is a form of self-consciousness that involves a conception of the mental self. His mental self view is opposed to the embodied self view, the view that the self must be conceived of as(More)
Recently, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver (2011) have argued that functional analyses in psychology lack explanatory autonomy from explanations in neuroscience. In this thesis I argue against this claim by motivating and defending a pragmatic-epistemic conception of autonomous psychological explanation. I argue that this conception of autonomy need not(More)