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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence
Faced with the failure of two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve a puzzle, a heretofore neglected solution on behalf of instrumentalism is articulate.
How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting
L. A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision—by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision—cannot yield rational
Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit
What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is
Reasons Wrong and Right
The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two
A Partial Defense of Permissivism
Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q,
Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?
A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass
ABSTRACT: The moral of Buridan's ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet, it is also commonly believed
Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative)
Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have
Patient preference predictors and the problem of naked statistical evidence
It is shown that the use of PPPs faces a version of a normative problem familiar from legal scholarship: the problem of naked statistical evidence, and it is suggested that the reply to the problem in the one domain ought to mirror the reply in the other.
Two Problems for Accepting as Intending*
It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth,