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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy, EconomicsSynthese
- 1 September 2018
TLDR
How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy
- 1 May 2015
L. A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision—by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision—cannot yield rational…
Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit
- Nathaniel Sharadin, Finnur Dellsén
- Philosophy
- 1 May 2019
What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is…
Reasons Wrong and Right
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy, Education
- 1 September 2016
The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two…
A Partial Defense of Permissivism
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy
- 1 March 2017
Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q,…
Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy
- 2 April 2016
A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own…
The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass
- Finnur Dellsén, Nathaniel Sharadin
- PhilosophyJournal of the American Philosophical Association
- 12 December 2017
ABSTRACT: The moral of Buridan's ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet, it is also commonly believed…
Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative)
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- Philosophy
- 1 May 2015
Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have…
Patient preference predictors and the problem of naked statistical evidence
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- PsychologyJournal of Medical Ethics
- 12 June 2018
TLDR
Two Problems for Accepting as Intending*
- Nathaniel Sharadin
- PhilosophyEthics
- 16 March 2018
It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth,…
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