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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence
Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents’Expand
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How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You're Expecting
L. A. Paul has argued that an ordinary, natural way of making a decision—by reflecting on the phenomenal character of the experiences one will have as a result of that decision—cannot yield rationalExpand
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit
What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it isExpand
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?
A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its ownExpand
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A Partial Defense of Permissivism
Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q,Expand
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Patient preference predictors and the problem of naked statistical evidence
Patient preference predictors (PPPs) promise to provide medical professionals with a new solution to the problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. I show that the useExpand
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Reasons Wrong and Right
The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these twoExpand
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Reasons and Promotion
A number of philosophers accept promotionalism, the view that whether there is a normative reason for an agent to perform an action or have an attitude depends on whether her doing so promotes aExpand
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Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative)
Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors haveExpand
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