Naoto Hamada

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School choice programs are implemented to give students/parents an opportunity to choose the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide choices for students/parents while maintaining distributional constraints on the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status. Previous works show that(More)
We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student’s wage, while a college’s budget for hiring students is limited. Stability is a crucial requirement for matching mechanisms to be applied in the real world. A standard stability(More)
This paper considers matching problems with hierarchical regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, it is known that nonwastefulness and fairness (which compose stability) are incompatible when minimum quotas are imposed. We develop a new strategy-proof nonwasteful mechanism called Adaptive Deferred Acceptance(More)
Although minimum quotas are important in many real-world markets, existing strategyproof mechanisms require an unrealistic assumption that all students consider all schools acceptable (and vice-versa). We develop a strategyproof matching mechanism called Priority-List based Deferred Acceptance mechanism with Minimum Quotas (PLDA-MQ), which works under more(More)
This paper develops a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for a school choice program called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS). We consider a setting where minimum quotas are imposed for each school, i.e., a school is required to be assigned at least a certain number of students to operate, and the(More)
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