Nagarajan Krishnamurthy

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We derive upper and lower bounds on the communication complexity of determining the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for some classes of stochastic games. We prove that pure equilibria of single controller stochastic games and those of SER-SIT (Separable Reward - State Independent Transition) games correspond to those of bimatrix games that are(More)
We model social storage systems as a strategic network formation game. We define the utility of each player in the network under two different frameworks, one where the cost to add and maintain links is considered in the utility function and the other where budget constraints are considered. In the context of social storage and social cloud computing, these(More)
Social Clouds have been gaining importance because of their potential for efficient and stable resource sharing without any (monetary) cost implications . There is a need, however, to look at how a social structure or relationship evolves to build a Social Cloud (by identifying factors that affect the social structure) and how social structure impacts(More)
Determining a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player non-zero sum game is known to be PPAD-hard (Chen and Deng, 2006 [5], Chen, Deng and Teng 2009 [6]). The problem, even when restricted to win-lose bimatrix games, remains PPAD-hard (Abbott, Kane and Valiant, 2005 [1]). However, there do exist polynomial time tractable classes of win-lose bimatrix games-such as,(More)
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