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Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's “Age of Reform”
A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from
The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives
Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all
The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height
Aluminum or aluminum foil is placed in communication with the interior of a cold cathode gas discharge display chamber to prevent undesirable quantities of mercury from entering the display chamber
Information acquisition in auctions
OUR AIM IN THIS PAPER is to study the incentives to acquire information. We consider decision problems where the payoff has the single-crossing property and signals are affiliated with the unknown
Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing
Citizens of two groups may engage in crime, depending on their legal earning opportunities and on the probability of being audited. Police audit citizens. Police behavior is fair if both groups are
Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price
The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two-player bidding games are proved and the uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria.
Committee Design with Endogenous Information
Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting. Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A "good" voting
The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations
We study a dynamic moral hazard model where the agent does not fully observe his performance. We consider the incentive effects of providing feedback to the agent: revealing to the agent how well he
Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
Summary.We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less
Time Allocation and Task Juggling
A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion