Mustafa Oguz Afacan

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Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets of the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions imposed on regions in medical residency matching, academic master’s programs in graduate school(More)
In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents in rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced “regional caps” which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. To accommodate regional caps, the government modified the deferred acceptance mechanism in a particular manner. Motivated by this(More)
We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools’ incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school becomes more preferred by students. We first show that no stable mechanism, or mechanism(More)
Kojima and Ünver (2011) are the first to characterize the class of mechanisms coinciding with the Boston mechanism for some priority order. By mildly strengthening their central axiom, we are able to pin down the Boston mechanism outcome for every priority order. Our main result shows that a mechanism is outcome equivalent to the Boston mechanism at every(More)
We propose a group robust stability notion which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first misreporting of preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in a school choice type of matching markets. Our first result shows that there is no group robustly stable mechanism even under acyclic priority structures (Ergin (2002)). Then,(More)
In the matching with contracts setting, we provide two new axiomatic characterizations of the “cumulative offer process” (COP ) in the domain of hospital choices satisfying “unilateral substitutes” and “irrelevance of rejected contracts.” We say that a mechanism is truncationproof if no doctor can ever benefit from truncating his preferences. Our first(More)
In some well-known hospital–intern type of matching markets, hospitals impose mandatory application fees on internship applicants to consider their applications. Motivated by this real-life phenomenon, we study the application fee overreporting incentives of hospitals in centralized matching markets by assuming that interns have finite budgets to spend on(More)
This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners’ dilemma with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it is(More)