Mustafa Akan

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We consider optimal pricing to consumers who are privately informed about both their valuations for the product and when they learn their valuations. Initially, consumers have private information about the distribution of their valuations and when they will learn their valuations, and over time, consumers privately learn their valuations. Because of its(More)
We consider the problem of designing an efficient liver allocation system for allocating donated organs to patients waiting for transplantation, the only viable treatment for end-stage liver disease. Given the scarcity of available organs relative to the number of patients waiting for transplantation, we model the system as a multiclass fluid model of(More)
  • Mustafa Akan, Oguzhan Alagoz Bar¬̧s, Ata F. Safa Erenay
  • 2008
We propose an e¢ cient liver allocation system for allocating donated organs to patients waiting for transplantation, the only viable treatment for End-Stage Liver Disease. We optimize two metrics which are used to measure the e¢ ciency: total quality adjusted life years and the number of organs wasted due to patients rejecting some organ o¤ers. Our model(More)
We consider a contracting problem in which a …rm outsources its call center operations to a service provider. The outsourcing …rm (which we term the originator) has private information regarding the rate of incoming calls. The per-call revenue (or margin) earned by the …rm and the service level depend on the sta¢ ng decisions by the service provider.(More)
Excessive diagnostic tests have long been viewed as one major aspect of the inefficiency in the healthcare system and are often attributed to the fee-for-service payment model. In this study, we investigate the underlying operational and economic drives behind physicians’ test-ordering behavior in an outpatient setting. We model and analyze the strategic(More)