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To the memory of my parents, Sara and Avraham Haviv To my mother and late father, Fela and Shimon Hassin Contents Preface xi 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Basic concepts 2 1.1.1 Strategies, payoffs, and equilibrium 2 1.1.2 Steady-state 4 1.1.3 Subgame perfect equilibrium 5 1.1.4 Evolutionarily stable strategies 5 1.1.5 The Braess paradox 5 1.1.6 Avoid the crowd or(More)
We consider an infinite-horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction. Under this model, the setup transportation/reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group-independent major setup cost plus retailer-dependent minor setup costs. In addition, each retailer is(More)
In this paper we study situations in which two firms offer identical service for possibly different prices and response times. Customers' choice between firms is based on their full price, which includes the service fee plus (expected) waiting costs. We consider a two level game. The first game is a non-cooperative game among customers who observe the(More)
In this paper we study the inversion of an analytic matrix valued function A(z). This problem can also be viewed as an analytic perturbation of the matrix A 0 = A(0). We are mainly interested in the case where A 0 is singular but A(z) has an inverse in some punctured disc around z = 0. It is known that A ?1 (z) can be expanded as a Laurent series at the(More)