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We consider an infinite-horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction. Under this model, the setup transportation/reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group-independent major setup cost plus retailer-dependent minor setup costs. In addition, each retailer is… (More)

We consider a single multi-server memoryless service station. Servers have heterogeneous service rates. Arrivals are routed to one of the servers, and the routing decisions are not based on the queue lengths. We consider two criteria for routing selection: the (Nash) equilibrium, under which each customer minimizes his own mean waiting time, given the… (More)

We consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers. This economies of scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady-state mean total number of customers in system. The question we pose is how the servers should split among… (More)

In this paper we study situations in which two firms offer identical service for possibly different prices and response times. Customers' choice between firms is based on their full price, which includes the service fee plus (expected) waiting costs. We consider a two level game. The first game is a non-cooperative game among customers who observe the… (More)

In this paper we study the inversion of an analytic matrix valued function A(z). This problem can also be viewed as an analytic perturbation of the matrix A 0 = A(0). We are mainly interested in the case where A 0 is singular but A(z) has an inverse in some punctured disc around z = 0. It is known that A ?1 (z) can be expanded as a Laurent series at the… (More)

Multiplicity of solutions is typical to systems where the individual's tendency to act in a certain way increases when more of the other individuals in the population act in this way. We provide a detailed analysis of a queueing model in which two priority levels can be purchased. In particular, we compute all of the Nash equilibrium strategies (pure and… (More)