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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignmentsExpand
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College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized
TLDR
We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Expand
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An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
TLDR
We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. Expand
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An Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial DictatorshipExpand
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House allocation with overlapping generations
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for onlyExpand
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Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We offer two characterizations of the prominent lottery assignmentExpand
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Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application ofExpand
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Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets
We introduce a dynamic framework to analyze two-sided matching interactions that occur repeatedly over time, such as teacher–student matching or hospital–intern markets in Britain. We propose aExpand
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On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theoryExpand
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Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility
TLDR
We show that no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves upon DA whether students have outside options or not. Expand
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