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- Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2013

- Alireza Toroghi Haghighat, Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- 2013 Eleventh Annual Conference on Privacy…
- 2013

We present an efficient and provably-secure e-voting protocol, which is a variant of the JCJ e-voting protocol (Juels et al., 2010). It decreases the total number of JCJ's operations from O(n<sup>2</sup>) to O(n), where n is the number of votes or voters (whichever is the maximum). Note that since the operations under consideration are time-consuming (e.g.,… (More)

- Alireza Toroghi Haghighat, Mohammad Ali Kargar, Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- 2013 10th International ISC Conference on…
- 2013

Chevallier-Mames et al, proved that in a specific condition (such as the lack of untappable channels and trusted-third parties), the universal verifiability and privacy-preserving properties of e-voting protocols are incompatible (WOTE'06 and TTE'10). In this paper, we first show a flaw in their proof. Then, we prove that even with more assumptions, such as… (More)

In this work we further enhance the work of Aiello et al. [1] on priced oblivious transfer, in which selling digital goods based on oblivious transfer is discussed. Their primary goal is to mimic a scenario in which a customer is buying digital goods from the vendor where the privacy of the customer is fully protected regarding which item(s) are bought or… (More)

- Navid Emamdoost, Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- ArXiv
- 2012

Traffic analysis is a type of attack on secure communications systems, in which the adversary extracts useful patterns and information from the observed traffic. This paper improves and extends an efficient traffic analysis attack, called “statistical disclosure attack.” Moreover, we propose a solution to defend against the improved (and, a fortiori, the… (More)

- Mohammad Sadeq Dousti
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2010

The concept of zero-knowledge proofs has been around for about 25 years. It has been redefined over and over to suit the special security requirements of protocols and systems. Common among all definitions is the requirement of the existence of some efficient “device” simulating the view of the verifier (or the transcript of the protocol), such that the… (More)

- Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2011

Many cryptographic primitives—such as pseudorandom generators, encryption schemes, and zero-knowledge proofs—center around the notion of approximability. For instance, a pseudorandom generator is an expanding function which on a random seed, approximates the uniform distribution. In this paper, we classify different notions of computational approximability… (More)

- Asghar Asgharian Sardroud, Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- 2009

DC-Nets can be considered as an important solution to anonymous communications. However, their high message and bit complexity is a major obstacle in their practical usage. All DC-Net protocols provide anonymity of both sender and receiver by establishing some anonymous channels for message transmission. We propose a new DC-Net protocol that permits n… (More)

- Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
- 2014

This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be… (More)

- Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili
- Int. J. Comput. Math.
- 2016

Disclaimer: This is a version of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to authors and researchers we are providing this version of the accepted manuscript (AM). Copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof will be undertaken on this manuscript before final publication of the Version of Record (VoR).… (More)