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We consider soft constraint problems where some of the preferences may be unspecified. This models, for example, situations with several agents providing the data, or with possible privacy issues. In this context, we study how to find an optimal solution without having to wait for all the preferences. In particular , we define an algorithm to find a(More)
We consider soft constraint problems where some of the preferences may be unspecified. This models, for example, settings where agents are distributed and have privacy issues, or where there is an ongoing preference elicitation process. In this context, we study how to find an optimal solution without having to wait for all the preferences. In particular,(More)
The stable marriage problem (SM) has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation , n men and n women express their preferences over the members of the other sex. Solving an SM means finding a stable(More)
Constraints and quantitative preferences, or costs, are very useful for modelling many real-life problems. However, in many settings, it is difficult to specify precise preference values, and it is much more reasonable to allow for preference intervals. We define several notions of optimal solutions for such problems , providing algorithms to find optimal(More)
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, including matching resident doctors to hospitals, and students to schools. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict order over the members of the other sex. Here we consider a more realistic case, where both men and women can express their(More)
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the stable marriage problem, where the men and women express their preferences using a preference list with ties over a(More)
We consider soft constraint problems where some of the preferences may be unspecified. This models, for example, settings where agents are distributed and have privacy issues, or where there is an ongoing preference elicitation process. In this context, we study how to find an optimal solution without having to wait for all the preferences. In particular,(More)
We define interval-valued soft constraints, where users can associate an interval of preference values, rather than a single value, to each instantiation of the variables of the constraints. This allows us to model a form of uncertainty and imprecision that is often found in real-life problems. We then define several notions of optimal solutions for such(More)