Minglai Cai

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The arbitrarily varying channel models transmission over a channel with an state that can change over time. We may interpret it as a channel with an evil jammer. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced by Blackwell, Breiman, and Thomasian in [8]. The wiretap channel models communication with security. It was first introduced by Wyner in [12].(More)
We determine the secrecy capacity of the compound channel with quantum wiretapper and channel state information at the transmitter. Moreover, we derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of this channel without channel state information and determine the secrecy capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel with channel state information at(More)
We determine the capacity of the classical compound quantum wiretapper channel with channel state information at the transmitter. Moreover we derive a lower bound on the capacity of this channel without channel state information and determine the capacity of the classical quantum compound wiretap channel with channel state information at the transmitter.
We establish the Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classicalquantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic secrecy capacity of the channel is zero, or it equals its randomness-assisted secrecy capacity. We analyze the secrecy capacity of these channels when the sender and the receiver use various resources. It turns out that randomness,(More)
We determine the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Furthermore, we determine the secrecy capacity of a mixed channel model which is compound from the sender to the legal receiver and varies arbitrarily from the sender to the eavesdropper. As an application we examine when(More)
We establish the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero, or it equals its randomness assisted secrecy capacity. We analyze the secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels(More)
We studied a three-node quantum network that enables bidirectional communication between two nodes with a half-duplex relay node for transmitting classical messages. A decode-and-forward protocol is used to perform the communication in two phases. In the first phase, the messages of two nodes are transmitted to the relay node. The capacity of the first(More)
We analyze arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. These channels are subject to two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping), and one active (jamming). We progress on previous works [5] and [6] by introducing a reduced class of allowed codes that fulfills a more stringent secrecy requirement than earlier definitions. In(More)
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