Mihkel Tombak

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I develop a model of an R&D race with knowledge accumulation. My model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of R&D races. Hence, firms’ knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the R&D race, and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications. In this more(More)
In this paper, we show that most small business owners are very different from the entrepreneurs that economic models and policy makers often have in mind. Using new data that samples early stage entrepreneurs just prior to business start up, we show that few small businesses intend to bring a new idea to market. Instead, most intend to provide an existing(More)
This paper presents a game-theoretic model to analyze how the existence of roduct-flexible manufacturing technology can affect the technology and market strategies of competing firms. Our two-firm, twomarket model allows each firm to invest in a technology dedicated to its home market or a flexible technology that also can be used to invade its rival's(More)
Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to deter entry or force exit. We determine that with free entry such(More)
In this paper, we compare an n-firm Cournot game with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibrium expected output and total surplus are lower while expected price and total profits are higher than the Cournot equilibrium ones(More)
Why Firms Form Research Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence by Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mikhel M. Tombak and Ralph Siebert The literature on research joint ventures (RJVs) has emphasized internalizing spillovers and cost-sharing as motives for RJV formation. In this paper we develop two additional explanations: product market complementarities and firm(More)
When a seller negotiates withmultiple buyers, how does over-confidence affect the timing of trade? In this paper we distinguish between over-confidence about trade opportunities and over-confidence about the terms of trade. In bargaining environments without externalities both types of over-confidence can cause delays in agreement. If externalities are(More)